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Evolutionary Biology has two principal explananda, fit and diversity (Lewontin 1978). Natural selection theory stakes its claim to being the central unifying concept in biology on the grounds that it demonstrates both phenomena to be the consequence of a single process. By now the standard story hardly needs reiterating: Natural selection is a force that operates over a population, preserving the better fit, culling the less fit, and along the way promoting novel solutions to adaptive problems. Amundson’s historical survey of the concept of adaptation captures the idea succinctly:
The phenomenon of adaptation is at the core of modern evolutionary biology. Natural selection, the mechanism universally regarded as the primary causal influence on phenotypic evolutionary change, is first and foremost an explanation of adaptation. (1996: 11)

At the same time, it appears that the capacity of natural selection to cause adaptations cannot account for every feature of the nature and distribution of biological form.  Reason to believe this devolves from the simple fact that the bearers of biological form are organisms and a salient fact about organisms is that each faces the tribunal of the environment as a corporate entity, not as a loose aggregate of independent traits. One consequence of this fact is that at each stage of its development from egg to adult an organism must be an integrated, functioning whole. Another is that for any form to arise in an organism at a time, it must develop from the materials and processes at the organism’s disposal. The requirement of integration and the processes of development that produce it leave their distinctive marks on form. It seems reasonable, then, to suppose that one might appeal to the processes of development and the principles by which they operate in explaining the nature and distribution of biological form.​[1]​ (See here Gould 1977; Rose and Lauder 1996)

So we have two strategies for explaining the nature and distribution of form: for want of better terms I’ll call them ‘adaptationism’ and ‘developmentism’. In broadest terms, the distinction between them is simple: one explains biological form by appeal to what it’s for, the other by how it develops. While there are various possible modus vivendi that these two strategies might adopt, it is particularly obvious that on the current Modern Synthesis view of things, they compete for explanatory relevance. Developmental explanations of form are relevant only to the extent that adaptive ones are not and vice versa. It is no news to anyone that the comparative merits of these explanatory approaches are currently under debate in evolutionary biology. Much of the current discussion of the adaptationism/developmentism issue surrounds where on the continuum from almost exclusive reliance on adaptive explanations to almost exclusive reliance on developmental explanations one ought to stand.

The supposition that the phenomena of adaptation and development compete for explanatory relevance is to my mind a mistake, one that has much of evolutionary biology and its thrall. My suspicion is that the error is the result of two fairly simple misconceptions. One is a misconception about the relation between natural selection and adaptation. The standard picture—the one I just sketched—is one in which natural selection is the force that causes adaptation. I believe that it is a simple category error to call selection a force and if it is a mistake to call selection a force, it is just as much a mistake to suppose that it causes adaptation. Another misconception concerns the relation between developmental processes and adaptation. On that same picture, developmental processes merely constrain the power of selection to cause adaptation. I maintain, in contrast, that developmental constraint is the sole cause of adaptation. I maintain that development and selection do not compete for explanatory relevance. Developmental explanations explain the causes of adaptations within individuals, natural selection explanations account for changes in the statistical structure of populations, together—and only together—they explain the phenomenon of adaptive evolution. As appealing as this picture of peaceful co-existence and mutual support is, it actually requires quite a departure from what I take to be the orthodox Modern Synthesis interpretation of the relation between a theory of development and the theory of natural selection. It is that departure I wish to outline here.





I.  The Two-Force Model: Selection, Development and Constraint

The Modern Synthesis theory of evolution combines a theory of inheritance which allows us to predict and explain the transmission of genotypes from one generation to the next through the mechanisms of Mendelian inheritance with a theory of selection which accounts for the way in which individual organisms survive or reproduce differentially as a function of their phenotypes. Each of the component elements of the theory is defined over a different domain--Lewontin (1974) calls them ‘genotypic space’ and ‘phenotypic space’ respectively. Phenotypes aren’t the units of Mendelian inheritance and genotypes aren’t what compete in the arena of selection. In order to effect the synthesis a set of transformation rules is needed for mapping the phenomena of genotype space onto those in phenotype space and vice versa. Mapping  changes in phenotypic space onto changes in genotypic space is, in principle at least, straight forward. Each organism has a different genome, so the change in phenotypic space brought about by differential survival of individuals also constitutes a change in the relative frequencies of genotypes. But mapping changes in genotypic space onto phenotypic space is less straight forward.  New mutations and new genetic combinations bring about new phenotypes according to a set of rules. The relation described by these rules is sometimes called the ‘genotype-phenotype map’(Wagner and Altenberg 1996). The details of this map are the province of a theory of development (Lewontin 1992).

The genotype-phenotype map might be ‘transparent’ or ‘opaque’ or somewhere in between. By transparent I mean simply that the magnitude and direction of changes in genotype space correspond closely to the magnitude and direction changes in phenotype space. In such cases we could, as it were, divide through by development. Changes to the kinds and frequencies of genotypes wrought by the processes operating over genotype space—replication, segregation, recombination, mutation etc.—could be mapped straight on to changes in phenotype space. Where the genotype-phenotype map is transparent, changes in biological form could be exhaustively explained by a combination of processes at the gene level plus processes operating exclusively at the level of phenotypes: natural selection. ​[2]​  On the other hand if the genotype-phenotype map is opaque, then changes in genotype space may not translate in any simple way into changes in phenotype space. Large transitions in genotype space may correspond to small or no changes in phenotype space, while small changes (or no changes) in genotype space may correspond to major phenotypic differences.​[3]​ If the genotype-phenotype map introduces changes of its own to phenotypic space, then we need to invoke a set of causal processes over and above selection to account for significant changes in form, viz. the processes of development.

We thus have two distinct sets of forces bringing about changes in biological form, the forces occurring in development which operate in the expression of genotypes as phenotypes and the force of selection. These are conceived as processes of quite different kinds. The processes of development occur within individuals and the force of selection operates over populations. There is nothing in this two-force picture, yet, to suggest that natural selection theory and a theory of development are essentially antagonistic. There are similar relations among forces in, say, dynamics. There we have at least two sorts of forces acting on bodies, gravitational and electromagnetic, but a theory of gravitation and a theory of electromagnetism are not antagonistic. The reason is that the respective effects of these forces are commensurable; they both cause acceleration. We can decompose the forces causing a body to accelerate and say how much of the effect is due to gravitation forces and how much to electromagnetic forces.​[4]​ Things are quite different between selection and development. Their respective effects are not commensurable insofar as only selection causes adaptation, or so it is commonly supposed.​[5]​ While there may be two sets of forces bringing about changes in form, only one of them causes adaptations.

In effect, then, the debate between adaptationism and developmentism is as much a dispute over the phenomena to be explained as it is a debate over their causes.  The adaptationist programme seeks to explain form qua adaptation (and thus invokes selection). The developmentist programme explains form as the consequence of developmental programmes and not as adaptations (Amundson 1994). Understood in this way, it can be seen that a theory of development by its very nature is only of secondary importance to evolutionary biology. If natural selection theory stakes its claim to centrality in evolutionary biology on the grounds that it unifies biology’s two principal explananda—fit and diversity—developmentism stakes its place at the periphery precisely because it leaves one of them out.

Developmental Constraint
Those who seek some form of détente between adaptationism and developmentism point out that the forces of development and the forces of selection can be measured against one another in useful ways. The processes of development may constrain the power of natural selection to produce adaptations. The general idea is that natural selection introduces biases in form which are a function of fitness.  Development introduces biases in form  which are independent of fitness. Sometimes, the biases in the distribution of form introduced by development make unavailable those variants that would otherwise be favoured by selection. The canonical definition of a developmental constraint is given by Maynard Smith et al (1985)

A developmental constraint is a bias in the production of variant phenotypes or a limit on phenotypic variability caused by the structure, character, composition, or dynamics of the developmental system. (Maynard Smith et al 1985: 266)

The way selection causes adaptation and the way development constrains form are sometimes illustrated by means of two pictorial devices, the Adaptive Landscape and the Epigenetic Landscape. I introduce them here in order to highlight the notion of developmental constraint on adaptation, but also because these landscapes help motivate my alternative conception of the proper relation between natural selection theory and a theory of development.

The Adaptive Landscape
The Adaptive Landscape was introduced by Sewall Wright (1931) as an aid to visualising the effect of natural selection on trait frequencies within a population. It has been co-opted since Wright’s time as a device that makes vivid the way in which natural selection causes both adaptation and adaptive radiation. We can represent the collection of genotypes in a population on a multidimensional grid, one dimension for each gene. The intersections depict whole genotypes.​[6]​ It’s more common to collapse these multiple dimensions into a two-dimensional surface. Each organismal genotype will have a fitness shown as an altitude on this surface.
 
The landscape picture suggests that as less fit individuals fall away and as more fit variants are introduced into the population, natural selection drives the population toward local fitness optima. Neighbouring populations on either side of a valley will diverge toward separate peaks. In this way, natural selection, by helping to change the constitution of a population, brings it about that over time the population comprises individuals that are on average better adapted and that populations diverge toward separate adaptive peaks in response to different selection pressures. The locus classicus of this use of the Adaptive Landscape is Simpson’s (1994) account of the adaptive radiation of horses.​[7]​

The Epigenetic Landscape
The way in which development impedes selection is sometimes illustrated by means of another pictorial device, the Epigenetic  Landscape devised by C.H. Waddington (1957). Waddington represented the trajectory of a developing tissue or organ (something he called a ‘creode’) from undifferentiated egg to highly differentiated endpoint by means of an inclined surface—the Epigenetic Landscape—starting with the undifferentiated egg stage at the top and culminating in the highly differentiated adult form at the bottom. The landscape is marked by a series of branching channels, like river valleys and their tributaries. We are to think of the development of a tissue, or organ as a ball rolling down this landscape. As it progresses it gets shunted into one channel or another, until finally it reaches its adult form.

Waddington thought that the imagery of the landscape helped clarify some of the most puzzling features of development. One is that there are only a few different kinds of tissue types. They are discrete and stable and yet they develop from the same undifferentiated, homogeneous precursors. This phenomenon is captured in the epigenetic landscape by the fact that toward the bottom of the landscape there is a limited number of channels; each is narrow and is separated from the others by steep-sided banks. Another puzzling developmental phenomenon is that even though the various creodes are sometimes highly susceptible to environmental triggers, they are also extremely robust. The development of a tissue or an organ will return to its determined trajectory despite all manner of environmental or epigenetic perturbations. This ‘environmental buffering’ of trajectories is represented by the banks of the valleys. A perturbation drives the developing tissue up the banks of a channel, whence it returns (often enough) to the stable point at the bottom of the valley. The steepness of the valleys corresponds to the degree to which a trajectory is buffered against perturbations. A third feature of development illustrated by the canalisation map is that of genetic buffering. Organisms carry an enormous amount of genetic variation but despite this variability there is startling constancy in the final products of ontogeny. Waddington coined the term ‘canalisation’ to cover these three salient features of ontogeny.

Where a developmental process is canalised, the genotype/phenotype map is opaque. As Oster et al (1980) say:
… the relationship between genes and phenotype is non-linear and certainly not one to one. Some perturbations can have no effect while others can have dramatic consequences. (p. 231)

Putting the adaptive and epigenetic landscapes together, we can see how the opacity of development—as represented by the canalised Epigenetic Landscape—might impede the power of natural selection to produce adaptations, as envisaged in the Adaptive Landscape. Canalisation constrains  phenotypic variation, the raw material that selection has to work on (e.g. see Griffiths and Sterelny 1998). The developmental system makes unavailable certain phenotypes which might otherwise be adaptively advantageous. It is as though the canalisation of development puts a cordon around certain parts of the adaptive landscape, making certain phenotypes inaccessible (in the sense of inexpressible). Were it not for canalisation, individuals with the genotypes corresponding to these fenced-off areas might well have much higher fitnesses than they actually do. If these fenced-off areas of the adaptive landscape were available, selection would drive the population  onto these uninhabited peaks. Wagner and Altenberg express the idea clearly.
For instance developmental constraints frustrate selection by restricting the phenotypic variation selection has to act upon. Adaptations would be able to evolve only to optima within the constrained space of variability. (1996: 973)

Waddington’s own experiments provide an example of the way that canalisation can constrain available phenotype. Waddington (1957) gave developing Drosophila eggs near lethal doses of ether. He found that some individuals developed a condition called bithorax—having two thoraxes.

This trait is familial, in the sense that given the appropriate environmental conditions it is passed from parents to offspring. In fact you can select for bithorax in such a way that the ether threshold for its manifestation becomes progressively lower until such time as the bithorax phenotype is manifested in those individuals with the bithorax genotype even in the absence of ether shock. Waddington concluded that the single thorax wildtype is heavily canalised, constrained to develop in all individuals despite the latent genetic variation in the population. Some organisms have the genetic endowment for bithorax, some haven’t and the difference between them doesn’t show up under normal environmental conditions. It only manifests itself once the flies are removed from the sorts of environments across which their development is buffered. Once the developmental trajectory is set free from the region of canalisation, all sorts of genetic differences between organisms show up as phenotypic differences. With a little imagine one could think of conditions under which these suppressed phenotypes are adaptively advantageous​​—the old adage that two thoraxes are better than one might well be true. But because the development of Drosophila is so heavily canalised in this regard, this trait is unavailable to be selected. That area of the adaptive landscape that corresponds to the genes for bithorax has been fenced off; consequently, selection could not drive a population there even if it were an adaptive peak.

If this is the appropriate interpretation of how the Epigenetic Landscape relates to the Adaptive landscape, it seems to confirm the suspicion that all a theory of development can contribute to the Modern Synthesis is an account of the way the processes acting within individuals impede the adaptation-promoting effects of selection. This rather pessimistic view of development follows quite naturally from the two-force conception of evolutionary theory and the idea that only selection causes adaptations. It is this view of evolutionary theory that promotes the antagonism between developmentism and adaptationism. It is also this view that consigns a theory of development to the margins of evolutionary biology. I think it is as deeply flawed as it is entrenched. 

In the next three sections I shall try to outline an alternative position. I start with the two-force model (Section II) I then move on to the causes of adaptation (III) and then try to outline an alternative conception of the relation of adaptationism to developmentism (IV).

II.  Natural Selection and Adaptation
It is commonplace for natural selection to be spoken of as a force which causes adaptations. Selection, we are told, is more than just the differential survival of individuals; it is the process that directs the emergence of new adaptive forms. Ernst Mayr is among the many who have advanced this claim:

When natural selection acts, step by step, to improve such a complex system as the genotype, it does not operate as a purely negative force…. It does not confine itself to the elimination of inferior gene combinations; rather, its most important contribution is to bring superior gene combinations together. It acts as a positive force that pays a premium for any contribution toward an improvement, however small. For this reason profound thinkers about evolution, such as Theodosius Dobzhansky, Julian Huxley, and G.G. Simpson, have called selection “creative”. (1976: 45-46).​[8]​

In fact talk of forces is common in evolutionary theory.​[9]​ 
Evolution is the development and maintenance of complex organization that functions appropriately in given conditions. There are many forces that hinder evolution—migration, sampling error, immigration, and so forth—but selection is the only process that causes evolution. (Bell 1997: xix)

At the same time, we are told that Darwin’s intellectual triumph in the discovery of natural selection was the consequence of a very simple change of perspective. Rather than ask how do individuals become so well adapted to their circumstances Darwin asked how did populations come to comprise individuals so well adapted. Mayr, (1976) famously, has dubbed this the shift from ‘typological’ thinking to ‘population thinking’. The general idea is that the population is the unit of evolutionary change and natural selection is a theory that explains the changes in population structure. It does so by appeal to the variation inherent in a population. As Lewontin (1974) states it:
[Darwin] called attention to the actual variation among actual organisms as the most essential and illuminating fact of nature. Rather than regarding the variation among members of the same species as an annoying distraction, as a shimmering of the air that distorts our view of the essential object, he made that variation the cornerstone of his theory. (emphasis in original p. 5)

So there are two salient features of natural selection theory: it is a theory of forces and  it explains by appeal to the variation within populations. But these two features look odd when juxtaposed.  A dynamical theory, such as Newtonian mechanics, explains the changes in a body that are a consequence forces impinging on it from outwith. A ‘variational’ theory, such as we have in, say, statistical mechanics, explains those changes in a population that are the consequence of the variation within. It seems to me that if natural selection is a variational theory, it isn’t dynamical and if it’s dynamical it isn’t variational.

Perhaps the simplest way to make this tension palpable is to consider the first articulation of natural selection theory in the Modern Synthesis. Fisher’s account of the structure of natural selection theory is comprehensively variational. He notoriously likened natural selection theory variously to statistical dynamics or thermodynamics (Hodge 1992). Just as one explains the trajectory of a volume of gas as a function of the statistical structure of the ensemble of molecules, one also explains the trajectory of a population undergoing selection as a function of its statistical structure. Further pressing the analogy with Thermodynamics, Fisher (1930) articulates a single law of natural selection. It has become known as Fisher’s Fundamental Theorem:
The rate of increase of fitness of any [population] at any time is equal to the additive genetic variance at that time (1930: 36)

Immediately on stating his fundamental theorem, Fisher draws the obvious parallel between it and The Second Law of Thermodynamics:
It will be noticed that the Fundamental Theorem… bears some remarkable resemblances to the Second Law of Thermodynamics. Both are properties of populations, or aggregates, true irrespective of the nature of the units which compose them; both are statistical laws; each requires of a physical system the constant increase of a measurable quantity, in the one case entropy of a physical system in the other the fitness (1930: 36).

The analogy between entropy and average fitness is particularly strained. It just isn’t true that natural selection inevitably increases average fitness, either locally or globally.​[10]​ Nevertheless, enough of the analogy between natural selection and Thermodynamics survives for our purposes. It demonstrates that natural selection yields statistical explanations of population-level phenomena.

Suppose that by some contrivance a volume of gas comes to have all its fast moving molecules in the North half of the container and the slow moving molecules in the South half. This volume of gas is far from thermodynamic equilibrium. It will move from this low entropy state toward an equilibrium state of high entropy in which in any arbitrarily chosen part of the container we are as likely to find a fast moving particle as a slow one. The statistical treatment of thermodynamics renders a strictly statistical explanation of this trajectory. The class of states in which the entropy is low is minute compared to the class of states in which the entropy is high. So low entropy states are less likely, on the whole, than high entropy states. The population of gas molecules moves toward a structure that is much more likely. In the same way, natural selection explains the changes in the structure of a population by appeal to differences in (trait) fitness. Trait fitness is strictly a statistical property of a trait type. It is the average of the fitnesses of individuals in a certain class, where the possession of heritable traits determines class membership. A population not at equilibrium exhibits variation in trait fitnesses; some trait types (classes) are more likely to increase in size than others. In such circumstances a population will tend to undergo a change in its relative trait frequencies—it is more likely that trait types with higher fitnesses will increase in relative frequency than decrease. The changes that natural selection theory predicts and explains are those that the statistical structure of a population—variation  in mean  fitnesses—make most likely. The explanatory apparatus shared by thermodynamics and natural selection is a statistical one.

The thermodynamics analogy makes evident another feature of the changes in a population  undergoing selection; spontaneity. Where an ensemble of molecules moves from low entropy to high, the change is spontaneous in the sense that once the energy levels of the particles and their distribution in the container are fixed, no further energy needs to be added to the system to get it to move toward equilibrium. Similarly, as Fisher’s analogy makes apparent, natural selection is seen as a tendency of populations that are not at fitness equilibrium. This too is spontaneous; once the fitnesses and their distribution are fixed, there is no need to introduce further forces to account for the change. Just as we don’t need to invoke a force—an entropising force—to explain the change in structure of an ensemble of molecules, we don’t need to invoke a force to explain the changes that occur within a population of organisms that manifests variation in fitness. 

If natural selection theory explains without invoking a force, there is little point in claiming that natural selection is a force. In fact it is misleading to do so. It misrepresents the type of theory that the Modern Synthesis is. We have inherited a kind of theoretical double-think in which selection is spoken of indiscriminantly as a Newtonian force and as change in the constitution of a population that is a consequence of its variation in fitness. The thermodynamics analogy, I think, better accords with ‘population thinking’, the essential feature of natural selection theory. Yet it is the Newtonian force reading that lends credibility to the conception of natural selection as a cause of adaptations. If selection really is the population level phenomenon we are told it is, then it doesn’t follow from the fact that selection explains the increase in average adaptive complexity within a population that it causes it. Indeed it strongly suggests that we must look elsewhere for the causes of adaptation. ​[11]​


III.  Developmental Constraint and Adaptation
If population thinking involves the recognition that the explananda of natural selection are population-level phenomena, it also involves an acknowledgement of what natural selection theory leaves out, viz. individual organisms. Natural selection theory explains the distribution of traits in a population, but it doesn’t explain of individuals how they came to have their particular traits. Adaptive traits must make their first appearance as phenotypes of individual organisms. It is to be expected, then, that natural selection should leave untouched the question what causes adaptive novelties to arise. In fact, Muller and Wagner (1991) contend that this is one of the most overlooked questions in all of evolutionary biology. Perhaps the reason, as these authors suggest, is the prevalence of the adaptationist programme, a precept of which is the claim that selection causes adaptations.  I hope to have done enough to cast some doubt on this claim. The obvious adaptationist response, surely, is that it questions of causation aside, the basic elements of the Modern Synthesis theory—selection, mutation and recombination—are sufficient to ensure that novel adaptations arise within populations. Many adaptationists appear to think this way (e.g. Dawkins 1986, 1998). As it turns out though, it is far from a trivial matter to get a population undergoing selection, mutation and recombination to generate adaptive novelty. A number of lines of evidence are converging on the conclusion that the capacity of populations to undergo adaptive evolution depends crucially upon the particulars of individual development.  “Adaptation requires that genetic change be able to produce adaptive phenotypic change. Whether or not adaptive changes can be produced depends critically on the genotype-phenotype map” (Wagner and Altenberg 1996. 968).

What features of the genotype-phenotype map are required for the emergence of novel adaptive forms?  The answer, in a word, seems to be epistasis. ‘Epistasis’ is an ambiguous term, it is used variously to pick out a statistical, population-level property and a causal, individual-level one. At the statistical/population level, epistasis is the amount of total phenotypic variation which is accounted for by non-additive interactions among genes (Wade 1992). At the individual-level, epistasis is the phenomenon whereby the effect of a gene on phenotype is affected or regulated by the other genes in the genome (Wagner and Altenberg 1996).​[12]​  Epistasis in this second sense is a property of the genoytpe-phenotype map and it is this property that seems to be implicated in emergence of adaptive novelty. In turn, epistasis within individual development seems to be a precondition for populations to undergo adaptive evolution.  The way in which epistasis affects the emergence of adaptive novelty is suggested by the work of Stuart Kauffman (1993, 1995).

Epistasis and Development
Organisms are complex, self-organising systems. The genes in the genome work together (with epigenetic resources) to build a highly complex adult organism from a simple, undifferentiated egg. Apart from this remarkable capacity for self-organisation, organisms are distinguished by their capacity for maintaining homeostasis. A successful organism must be able to withstand, and compensate for, perturbations both in its environment and in its genome. One question we can ask in light of these requirements is ‘what sort of properties must a self-organising system have in order to attain this sort of finely honed stability?’.

Kauffman addresses this question by means of a set Boolean network models.​[13]​ A Boolean network is an array of nodes interconnected by various sorts of regulatory relations. Each node may take either of two values, say 1 or 0. The value of a node at a time is determined by its value at the previous time, the values of the nodes it is connected to and the nature of the connection. These sorts of models are familiar territory in connectionist psychology. Kauffman employs them to represent the regulatory interactions among genes. A genome is represented as an extremely large Boolean network where each gene is a node. The connections between the nodes play the part of epistatic interactions. Where epistatic interactions are high the value of any node is directly influenced by the value of many others. Where they are low, each node is affected by few others. Where epistatic interactions equal zero, no node directly affects any other. Perturbations are introduced into the networks by altering the value of one or more of the nodes.  This is analogous to the introduction of one or more mutations in a genome. We may think of the configuration of the system, the patterns of ones and zeros, as the total phenotype.​[14]​

The Boolean models demonstrate that where epistatic interactions are high, the networks are highly unstable and chaotic. Where epistatic interactions are zero, the network is essentially frozen, each ‘mutation’ has a miniscule effect on the configuration of a system and no compensatory changes are made to return the system to its original configuration. Where epistasis is small but non-negligible remarkable things occur. The introduction of a ‘mutation’ ramifies throughout a considerable portion of the network, but eventually the network settles into a stable configuration. Further perturbations disturb the system, but it compensates and settles back into the same stable configuration. Occasionally the network will be perturbed to the extent that it settles into a new stable configuration.

These low-epistasis systems demonstrate a remarkable capacity to effect compensatory changes when perturbed. In this manner they maintain stable homeostatic configurations. They also exhibit the capacity to adopt novel configurations and to retain them by effecting compensatory changes. The stability of these systems and their adaptability are merely two sides of the same coin; they are the principal characteristic of complex adaptive systems (Holland 1995). The Boolean models of gene interaction demonstrate that this capacity is achieved in organisms through the correct degree of epistasis. Kauffman tells us:

This a first hint of something like a construction requirement to make complex systems with many interacting parts which remain perfectible by mutation and selection. Each part should impinge on rather few other parts (1993: 67)

These models are highly idealised and speculative; they are also highly suggestive. If only complex adaptive systems are capable of generating adaptive novelty and it is the degree of epistasis that causally determines whether an organism is a complex adaptive system, then this evidence suggests that epistatic interactions among genes causally determine the emergence of adaptive novelty. 

Epistasis and the Adaptive Landscape
If epistasis determines the conditions under which individuals can manifest novel adaptations, it also appears to determine the conditions under which populations can undergo adaptive evolution. Kauffman (1993, 1995) notes that only certain adaptive landscapes are propitious for adaptive evolution. Landscapes in which the fitness values (altitudes) of neighbouring genotypes are very highly correlated and in which each gene effects the overall fitness of the genotype independently do not result in adaptive evolution. These landscapes have a single fitness optimum and ‘shallow’ slopes—Kauffman calls them ‘Fujiyama’ landscapes. The shallow slopes represent small selection co-efficients and in populations where selection co-efficients are very small, mutation rates of any appreciable size will introduce genes of low fitness faster than selection eliminates them. These populations tend not to increase in average adaptedness. On the other extreme, landscapes in which adjacent genotypes have highly uncorrelated fitnesses have very numerous low and randomly dispersed local optima, each one not much greater than the average population fitness. Kauffman calls these ‘rugged’ landscapes. Their topography might be likened to that of a lava flow. On these rugged landscapes there is little tendency for adaptive novelty to arise and little tendency for adaptive evolution. Between the ‘Fujiyama’ and the ‘lava flow’ topographies there is an intermediate kind of landscape. These landscapes are neither shallow-sloped nor randomly rugged and have multiple adaptive peaks. Here the fitness of any given genotype is sufficiently highly correlated with its neighbours for the possession of a gene to be a reasonably good predictor of genotype fitness, yet the landscape allows for steep slopes and local optima of significant height. These are the landscapes on which adaptive evolution occurs. On these landscapes the differential retention of genes and introduction of new variants through mutation can result in the population increasing its average adaptedness. It also allows that new combinations of genes can have significantly greater (or lower) than average fitnesses. In this way it allows adaptive novelties to arise. 

Kauffman’s models demonstrate that the degree of epistasis within individuals in a population determines the kind of landscapes that a population inhabits. Populations of individuals exhibiting no epistasis among their genes inhabit ‘Fujiyama’ landscapes. In contrast, populations of organisms with very high degrees of epistasis inhabit ‘lava flow’ landscapes. Where the degree of epistasis is low but not negligible, populations inhabit smooth, highly-correlated multiply-peaked landscapes. In these situations, while a gene may be a reasonably good predictor of individual fitness, irrespective of the presence of other genes, certain combinations of genes may significantly increase or decrease individual fitnesses. Taken together the models suggest that the capacity of a population to undergo adaptive evolution is determined by the capacity of its organisms to mount adaptive responses to (genetic and epigenetic) perturbations and that this capacity of organisms is a consequence of the appropriate degree of epistasis among genes of the genome. Epistasis—a feature of the genotype/phenotype map​​—is a causal pre-condition not just for the emergence of adaptive novelty within individuals but also for adaptive evolution within populations.

These requirements on adaptive evolution are pre-figured in Lewontin’s (1978) discussion of the pre-requisites for adaptive evolution. According to Lewontin, adaptive evolution requires ‘continuity’ and quasi-independence. Continuity is the condition wherein neighbouring phenotypes be correlated in their fitness (Kauffman’s requirement is that neighbouring total genotypes be so correlated). Quasi-independence is the condition in which ‘in a reasonable proportion of cases’ adaptive changes in one structure do not redound too negatively on others. I think the Boolean models demonstrate how epistatic interactions  among genes secures continuity and quasi-independence and how these conditions in turn determine the topography of the adaptive landscape.

Epistasis and the Epigenetic Landscape
A further implication of the models is that the correct degree of epistasis confers on the genotype/phenotype map precisely that set of features which characterises canalised development. According to Waddington’s epigenetic landscape canalisation encompasses three significant features of development: (i) buffering against mutations—many different genetic variants produce the same phenotypic outcome (ii) buffering against environmental perturbations—many different environmental conditions and perturbations produce the same phenotypic outcome; and (iii) adaptability—occasionally, mutational and environmental presssures result in novel yet stable phenotypes e.g. bithorax. These are exactly the properties exhibited by complex, self-organising systems with the correct degree of epistasis. The epigenetic landscape is thus a picture of the way in which developmental process determine the capacity of organisms to generate novel adaptive forms.

This ought to occasion a reevaluation of the way the Epigenetic landscape relates to the Adaptive Landscape. In Section I I introduced the epigenetic landscape as an illustration of the way that development is thought to constrain the power of natural selection to produce adaptations. On that picture, the Epigenetic Landscape demonstrates how development might prevent selection from moving a population to adaptive optima by making certain areas of phenotypic space unavailable. The discussion of this section suggests an alternative picture in which the nature of the Epigenetic Landscape actually determines the topography of the Adaptive Landscape. Consider again the bithorax example. Across a wide range of environments the difference between those flies with the bithorax genotype and those without has no phenotypic effect. These different genotypes correspond to the same phenotype and hence have the same fitnesses. It is not that the ‘peak’ in the Adaptive Landscape that corresponds to the bithorax gene is made unavailable.  It is simply that because of canalisation the bithorax and the single thorax genotypes have the same fitness; there is no peak. On the other hand, in some circumstances (beyond the range of canalisation), minor differences in genotype manifest themselves as highly different, but viable phenotypes with potentially very different fitnesses. This just demonstrates that for some environments, or for some mutations, adjacent (total) genotypes may differ significantly in fitness. In effect, I think this shows how canalisation implements Lewontin’s continuity and quasi-independence requirements on adaptive evolution. So, a population occupies an Adaptive Landscape that is propitious for adaptive evolution only if it comprises individuals whose developmental programmes are canalised: The features of the Epigenetic Landscape determine the structure of the Adaptive Landscape. On this alternative interpretation, the canalisation of development doesn’t constrain adaptive evolution; canalisation causes adaptive evolution. Now on anybody’s view canalisation is developmental constraint, the introduction of biases in phenotype that are a consequence of the development of the organism. So the paradoxical conclusion is that developmental constraint causes adaptative evolution.


IV.  Natural Selection Development and Adaptation
I believe that we have now assembled the ingredients for an alternative picture of the way in which a theory of development and a theory of selection combine to explain biological fit and diversity.  Perhaps a brief inventory of the pieces will help show how to put them together. In section I, I discussed what I called the ‘two-force’ model of evolutionary theory, according to which the evolution of form is governed by two wholly distinct sorts of forces, those acting within an individual during development and those, like selection, which act across a populations. Furthermore, I claimed that the general Modern Synthesis orthodoxy has it that the only cause of adaptation is natural selection. In section II, I argued that natural selection theory is not a theory of forces. It is simply a statistical theory, like thermodynamics, that describes the most likely trajectories of a population given its statistical structure—variations in its trait fitnesses. Like thermodynamics it is an ensemble-level theory and like thermodynamics it is consistent with any number of individual-level causal processes, but identifies none. This argues strongly against the two-force model. It is a simple category error to suppose that natural selection is a force. These considerations also demonstrate that it doesn’t follow from the fact that selection explains adaptive evolution that it causes adaptive evolution. In section III, I presented evidence from recent developmental biology that suggests that developmental constraint causes adaptive novelty. The results of section III are independent of those of section II, so the alternative picture could take either of two forms. The least radical departure would be to preserve the two-forces model and simply append development as another cause of adaptation. The more radical solution would be to discard the two forces-model altogether, and with it the notion of selection as a cause of adaptation. I discuss these amendments in turn.

The Two-Force Model
Most biologists and philosophers who have commented recently on the importance of the processes of development to the origin of adaptive novelty have sought to preserve the notion of natual selection as a force which causes adaptation.​[15]​ Kauffman, for instance, often suggests that he sees his project as one of delimiting the interaction between the force of selection and self-organisation. One way natural selection and self-organisation may interact is antagonistic (Richardson and Burian 1998). Self-organisation can constrain the power of selection. “In brief, if selection can only slightly displace evolutionary systems from the generic properties of underlying ensembles, those properties will be widespread in organisms not because of selection, but despite it” (Kauffman 1993: 24  emphasis on original). Another way is ‘collaborative’. Self-organisation may and selection may both favour the emergence and retention of adaptive forms. Yet another suggestion is that those features of the genotype-phenotype map which promote the capacity to generate adaptive novelties are themselves subject to the force of selection (Wagner and Altenberg 1996). As Kauffman expresses the matter… “Furthermore, natural selection may be the force which pulls complex adaptive systems into this boundary region” (1993: 219 emphasis added).​[16]​  

This re-evaluation goes some way toward redressing some of the weaknesses of the orthodox interpretation of evolutionary theory. At least it envisages a more central role for a theory of development. It implies that development can, to some degree, explain the fit of organic form. Sterelny (2001) correctly suggests that this rethinking of evolutionary theory occasions no great change in its structure. It still leaves selection and development competing for explanatory relevance. This model raises the question  which of the two sets of forces causing adaptive evolution—selection or development—is more efficacious. The fundamental weakness of this revision is its reliance on the two-forces model. I recommend another alternative.

The One-Force Model
If there is no force of selection operating over populations then the only forces capable of generating adaptive novelties are those occurring within (and upon) individuals. If one wants to explain the causes of adaptations, then, one should look to a theory that operates in this domain—development. An adequate theory of development should explain why organisms are capable of generating adaptations; it should also account for the particular adaptations that have arisen. In this sense development encompasses and unifies both of evolutionary biology’s two explananda: fit and diversity. No appeal to natural selection is necessary and none is sufficient to explain the origin of adaptions.

It would be an error to conclude from this that the theory of natural selection would be rendered redundant by a mature theory of development. There would still be a significant and irreducible role for natural selection theory to play. Again, the thermodynamics or statistical dynamics analogy is instructive in this regard. There may be a complete Newtonian explanation of the trajectory of each of an ensemble of molecules. By tracing the velocities of the particles and the energies of their collisions we may well have a workable explanation of how each particle came to be where it is with the kinetic energy it currently has. This configuration of particles would, of course, entail the temperature, pressure and entropy properties of the ensemble. But this explanation would not explain why the trajectory of the ensemble characterised in terms of pressure, temperature and entropy was to be expected. For that we need the statistical theory of ensemble-level properties. Instead of two-kinds of forces—Newtonian operating at the individual level and ‘entropic’ forces acting at the ensemble level—we have one kind of force, Newtonian, and two levels of explanation: the individual and the ensemble. Each of these levels has its respective theory. The alternative picture I am proposing for evolutionary biology has this same structure. There is only one level of forces yet there are two distinct levels of explananda: the individual and the ensemble. Even if a mature theory of development were to tell us how and why adaptive novelties emerge, we would still need a statistical, population level theory to explain why populations which manifest variation in their fitness tend to increase in their average adaptedness. A theory of development and the theory of natural selection are related as are Newtonian Mechanics and statistical dynamics, or thermodynamics. The first theory in each pair identifies causal processes operating at the level of individuals; the second explains ensemble-level phenomena that are the consequence of these same individual-level forces. The first theory in each pair is dynamical; the second is statistical.







Amundson R.  1996  Historical Development of the Concept of Adaptation. In M. Rose  and G.V. Lauder 1996 Adaptation New York: Academic Press. 11-53.
Amundson, R.  1994  Two Concepts of  Constraint: adaptationism and the challenge from developmental biology Philosophy  of Science 61: 556-578.
Ayala, F.  1970  Teleological explanations in evolutionary biology.  Philosophy of Science 37: 1-15.
Bell, G.  1997 Selection The Mechanism of Evolution. New York: Chapman Hall
D.J. and B.H. Weber  1995  Darwinism Evolving: Systems dynamics and the genealogy of natural selection.  Cambridge, Ma.: MIT Press.
Demetrius, L.  2000  Thermodyanamics and evolution.  Journal of Theoretical Biology.
Dobzhansky, T.  1951  genetics and the Origin of Species. 3rd edition. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Dobzhansky, T.  1980  Morgan and his school in the 1930’s In Mayr, E.  and W.D. Provine, (eds.)  1980 The Evolutionary Synthesis.  Cambridge. Ma.: Harvard University Press. pp. 445-451
Fisher, R.A.  1930 The Genetical Theory of Evolution New York: Dover.
Gould, S.J,  1985 The Hardening of the modern synthesis. In Grene, M. (ed) 1983Dimensions of Darwinism Cambridge: CUP pp. 71-93.
Gould, S.J. and R.C. Lewontin 1979 The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm: A critique of the adaptationist paradigm. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B205, 581-598.
Hamburger, V.  1980  In  E. Mayr and W.B. Provine  The Modern Synthesis  Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press. pp. 303-308
Hodge, M.J. S. 1992  Biology and Philosophy (Including Ideology): A study of Fisher and Wright. In S. Sarkar (ed) 1992 The Founders of Evolutinoary Genetics. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science Vol 142.New York:Kluwer pp 231-393
Kauffman, S.  1993  The Origins of Order. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kaufffman,m S.  1995  At Home in the Universe  Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Levins, R. and R.C. Lewontin.  1985  The Dialectical Biologist  Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press.
Lewontin, R.C.  1974  The Genetical Basis of Evolution New York: Columbia University Press.
Lewontin, R.C. 1978. Adaptation Reprinted in Levins and R.C. Lewontin  1985  The Dialectical Biologist Cambridge, Ma.:Harvard. 65-84.
Matthen, M  and A Ariew (in prep)  Two ways of thinking about fitness.
Maynard Smith, J., R. Burian, S. Kauffman, P. Alberch, J. Campbell, B. Goodwin, R. Lande, D. Raup and L. Wolpert   1985  Develomental constraints and evolution. Quarterly Review of Biology 60: 265-287
Mayr, E.  1976  Toward a New Philosophy of Biology. Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press.
Neander, K.  1995  Explaining complex adaptations: A reply to Sober’s “Reply to Neander”.  British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.  46: 583-587.
Oster, G., G. Odell and P. Alberch  1980 Mechanics, Morphogenics and Evolution  Lectures on Mathematics in the Life Sciences 13: 1980
Rose, M. and G.V.Lauder  1996 Post-Spandrel adaptationism In M. Rose  and G.V. Lauder 1996 Adaptation New York: Academic Press. Pp 1-8
Sewall Wright,  1931  Evolution in Mendelian populations.  Genetics 16:97-159.
Simpson, G.G. (1944) Tempo and Mode in Evolution Columbia University Press edition (1984)
Sober, E.  1984  The Nature of Selection. Cambridge, Ma.: MIT Press.
Sterelny, K and P. Griffiths  1998  Sex and Death Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Waddington, C.H.  1957  The Strategy of the Genes London: Allen and Unwin
Waddington, C.H.  1961  Evolutionary adaptation. Reprinted in H. Plotkin (ed)  1982  Learning, Development and Cutlure: Essays in Evolutionary Epistemology.  Chicago: Wiley.  pp 173-193.
Wagner, G. and L. Altenberg.  1996  Complex adaptations and the Evolution of Evolvability.  Evolution 50: 967-976







^1	  These issues (and more) are raised in Gould and Lewontin (1979). 
^2	  This is similar to Hamburger’s (1980) idea that development is treated as a ‘black box’ in much of Modern Synthesis biology. The transparency assumption was made explicitly by Fisher in his formulatrion of the Moderrn Synthesis theory. (See Hodge 1992)
^3	  For examples of the way opacity might manifest itself see Oster et al (1980) 
^4	  See Matthen and Ariew (in prep) on the characteristics of a theory of forces.
^5	  In fact an adaptation is commonly defined as a trait whose prevalence is a consequence of natural selection, where the selection in question has been for the trait’s particular effects.
^6	  In fact this is something of a misappropriation of Sewall Wright’s original landscape. In Wright’s versions the axes were allelic frequencies within a population. Points in n​-dimensional space represent the frequencies of alleles at n-1 loci. They do not represent a total genotype of n-1 genes as in later versions of the landscape (See Simpson (1994), Dobzhansky (1953), Kauffman (1993))
^7	  See Also Gould’s discussion of Dobzhansky in Grene (1983).  
^8	  Endorsement of the ‘creative power’ of selection is  remarkably widespread. A sampling of such passages may be found in Dobzhansky 1980, Ayala 1971, Neander 1995….
^9	  The first half of Elliott Sober’s Nature of Selection (1984) is the most lucid and comprehensive development of this view.
^10	  See Levins and Lewontin (1985) and, more recently by Demetrius (2000). Depew and Weber (1995 Ch 10) and Hodge (1992) further discuss the presumed analogy between thermodynamics and natural selection theory.
^11	  I am indebted to Peter Clark and to various members of the Wisconsin-Madison Philosophy colloquium for help with this section.
^12	  I thank Andre Ariew for pointing me to this ambiguity.
^13	  Illuminating discussions of this work can be found in Kauffman (1993, 1995) Depew and Weber (1995), Weber and Depew (1995), Richardson and Burian (1996)
^14	  Kauffman thinks of them as the pattern of gene activities.
^15	  e.g. Sterelny 2001, Wagner and Altenberg (1996), Richardson and Burian (1998), Depew and Weber (1995).
^16	  A similar view is endorsed by Depew and Weber. Indeed Waddington himself appeared to have thought this way (see e.g. 1957, 1961)
